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Abstract 
 
In this paper it is argued that Korea and other countries in East Asia like Korea have a particular fate 
quite predictable in the long run in terms of economic growth and political dependency unless 
economic integration takes place in a particular direction. Thus the presence of the potentially giant 
China makes things “difficult” for “Korean” countries (e.g Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and even 
Japan). This fate is not coloured with optimism unless some measures are taken that ensure a 
particular way of integration in East Asia. It is not unique that a giant economy is the centre of 
economic activities for the wider region. Unlike the European Union which does not contain any giant 
member in its process of integration, the USA could be the closest good example of how neighbouring 
countries have evolved next to this giant. In East Asia the situation is not similar to that of the USA at 
the moment, but in this paper there is a set of propositions and arguments that predict the fate of 
“Korean” economies next to a potentially giant China. Several methods will be used to demonstrate 
the validity of these propositions (mathematical model, cluster and scale analyses, and so on). Various 
strategies will be examined in the context of the propositions. It will be demonstrated that the short 
term and long term strategies that countries such as Korea and Thailand in isolation might have to 
follow are not necessarily consistent unless an overall strategy of regional integration takes place.  
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Introduction 
The East Asia region is becoming the hot spot of the world economic development. 
The rates of growth are consistently very high, higher than any other region in the 
globe. The huge population and workforce that this area has is a powerful weapon for 
economic expansion. This region also includes some of the oldest and most dynamic 
societies. One of them is also one of the largest countries and economies and is 
probably becoming the next superpower on this planet. China is indeed the new 
superstar on the economic arena and soon on the political arena. But we can start 
asking questions as to the destiny of this region, the Central Country (China), and the 
smaller nations in the area, such as Korea and Thailand. To uncover this destiny let us 
briefly examine some of the recent trends in some key indicators. 
 
First the ratios of each country’s or region’s GDP to world GDP over time are shown 
in Figures 1 and 2. It is quite apparent that the USA’s and West Europe’s ration 
remains constant, Japan’s ratio declines and China’s rises, whereas ASEAN’s1 and 
Korea’s rise as well but not as much as that of China. 
 
                                                 
1 Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia. 
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Figure 1  Ratios of a given country’s GDP to total world GDP 
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Notes: ASEAN consists of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Philippines; “au+ca+nz” stands for 
Australia plus Canada, plus New Zealand.  
 
Figure 2 Ratios of a given country’s GDP to total world GDP 
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Second, the ratio of a country’s exports to total world exports for some selected 
countries is shown in Figure 3. Korea’s, ASEAN’s, and especially China’s such ratio 
has been increasing, whereas Japan’s has been declining; the USA’s ratio only 
recently started declining2.   
                                                 
2 West Europe’s ratio (not shown in this Figure) has been constant at about 40%. 
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Figure 3 Ratios of a country’s exports to total world exports 
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Figure 4 Ratios of Korean exports to some selected countries 
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In Figure 4, the ratios of Korean exports to China and some other countries are shown. 
It is obvious that the ratio of exports to China over total exports has been growing 
very fast, whereas the ratio of exports to the USA and Japan has been declining. If we 
also add Hong Kong and Taiwan Chinese provinces then Korea is very fast depending 
on its exports to overall China for its economic prosperity. 
 
Given the above brief account of trends in the East Asia region, some questions arise 
of paramount importance. Where will the Chinese expansion and growth stop? Will 
other nations, such as Korea see their economies fused with China eventually? Will 
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East Asia be integrated in the long run? Will this integration include some nations on 
the other side of the Pacific Ocean? In the present paper some preliminary answers to 
these questions will be provided as a hypothesis, called the fusion hypothesis of 
integration. 
 
In the next section a mathematical model will examine some long term dynamic 
issues regarding the above questions. In section 3, some other methods will attempt to 
further confirm the fusion hypothesis. In section 4, a discussion will follow and some 
conclusions will be drawn.  
 
Long term equilibrium: dynamic considerations 
Let us determine the long term behaviour of a country like Korea in terms of its 
exports to China and to another country in the cluster. This can be achieved by 
considering a homogeneous3 system of two differential equations: 
11 12x x yα α= +  
21 22y x yα α= +          (1) 
In system (1) we can predict the sign of the coefficients ijα  almost with certainty. 
Thus, the rate of growth of Korean exports to China x depends positively on the level 
of these exports, hence the coefficient 11α has a positive sign; and it depends 
negatively on the level of Korean exports to another country4 in the region, hence the 
coefficient 12α  has a negative sign. This is already observed in the Korean exports
5 to 
China and to the other countries in the region. Regression analysis for the existing 
                                                 
3 The discussion for a non-homogeneous system is the same as for a homogeneous system (see also 
below), since a linear transformation of the existing variables into new ones will yield the same results 
(the analysis here is based on Sydsaeter et al, 2005).  
4 Or all other countries in the region. 
5 The date for exports and GDP are extracted form the World Bank (2005) data basis.  
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data and simulation with extended data with the same pattern into the next 15-25 
years shows that the signs of these coefficients are correctly predicted.  The rate of 
growth of Korean exports to another country (or group of countries) y depends 
positively on the level of these exports, hence the coefficient 22α has a positive sign; 
and it depends negatively on the level of Korean exports to China, hence the 
coefficient 21α  has a negative sign.     
 
The solution to this system is: 
1 2
1 1
t tx Ae v Be uλ λ= +   and  1 22 2
t ty Ae v Be uλ λ= +      (2) 
where 1λ , 2λ  are the two real eigenvalues determined by the following equation: 
2
11 22 11 22 12 21( ) ( ) 0λ α α λ α α α α− + + − =  (3) 
We are interested in proving that at least one eigenvalue is real negative so that we 
have either a sink solution to (1) and hence globally asymptotically stable (in this case 
both eigenvalues must be real negative) or a saddle solution to (1) and hence a local or 
global unique equilibrium. A priori we would opt for the plausibility of a saddle 
solution since there are so many factors that can influence the very long term 
equilibrium that at any moment a saddle stable point can easily become unstable (as 
the image of a saddle would suggest).  
 
To determine the signs of the two eigenvalues derived from (3) we must now show 
the expected sign of the quantity under the square root of the two solutions of (3) 
denoted as D: 
2
11 22 11 22 12 21( ) 4( )D α α α α α α= + − −        (4) 
This quantity is equal to: 211 22 12 21( ) 4( )D α α α α= − +  
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which is always >o, if 12α , 21α are either both positive or both negative. We already 
know that  these coefficients are both negative, hence D>0.  
 
Hence the signs of 1λ , 2λ  depend on the quantities of:  11 22 Dα α+ + , and 
11 22 Dα α+ − respectively.    The former quantity is always >o since 11 22α α+  >0. 
As we can easily show the quantity 11 22 Dα α+ −  <0. Consequently we have two 
real eigenvalues (providing that 12α  and 21α are not equal), one positive and one 
negative and hence we have a saddle point. 
 
Another way to approach this problem is to say that for a non-homogeneous system: 
11 12 1x x yα α β= + +  
21 22 2y x yα α β= + +          (5) 
the saddle point is a unique global equilibrium if 11 22 12 21α α α α−    <0 (Sydsaeter et al, 
2005). In this case both eigenvalues 1λ , 2λ are real and of opposite sign each. For this 
to happen, we must have 12 21α α  > 11 22α α . As both 12α  and 21α are negative whereas 
the other two coefficients are positive, then the latter inequality takes place only if the 
cross (or indirect) impact of Korean exports as indicated by 12α  and 21α is larger than 
the direct impact of 11α  and 22α . These cross impacts are probably the main reason as 
to why we might have the strong tendency for a continuous increase of Korean 
exports to China to the detriment of all other Korean exports (diversion effect). 
 
We have thus proved that Korean exports to China will keep increasing to the 
detriment of Korean exports to all other countries, since no other country is in the 
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same position as China is, unless a different policy of integration is followed (see 
below). To further show this outcome, consider a more complicated case of Korean 
exports to China and Korean exports to other countries as shown by the following 
non-linear system of differential equations: 
2
( 2 )
x ax bx y
y w a bx y
= − −
= −
 (6) 
Providing the right initial values of x and y exist, the saddle solution to this system is 
point 2( / 2 , / 4 )S a b a b=         (7) 
The parameters a and b can be such that the solution S is for example, 85% Korean 
exports to China and 11% Korean exports to a group of other countries in the region 
in the very long run.    
 
The foregoing dynamic analysis provides some extra evidence to the fusion 
hypothesis promoted in this paper. In the very long term, Korean exports can be fused 
or almost totally integrated with China’s economy. This is already happening with 
Canada and Mexico in relation to the USA. Canada’s exports to the USA were about 
65% in the 1970s; they are now at about the 85% level. Mexico’s economy is even 
more fused with that of the USA. Mexico’s exports to this country were about 80% in 
1990 and are now more than 90%. There are of course differences between the 
situation of Korea vis-à-vis China and the situation of Canada or Mexico vis-à-vis the 
USA. For example, Canada has had a parallel strong economic development with the 
USA in the last 200 years. Korea and China have only been accelerating their 
economic growth recently.  However, one very important similarity exists between all 
these pairs of countries; thus, both Canada and Mexico are small economies in 
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relation to the USA and they are all neighbours. The same holds for Korea and China 
in a potential way, mainly due to their population size difference.     
 
If what happened to Canada and Mexico vis-à-vis the USA can happen to Korea (or 
any other “Korean” economy such as potentially Vietnam, Thailand, or even Japan) 
we may ask the plausible question as to what the reasons are for this eventual fusion. 
An obvious first answer to this question is the huge market in China for any small 
economy to be attracted to and be an integral part of. Other reasons are: similar 
cultures, some common historical events; increasing globalization; regional 
integration policies; and so on. One extra reason is the importance of the central 
location of the Shanghai region as we will analyse below.  
 
If we apply the same differential equations model to Korean GDP growth rate ( x ), 
the latter depends on the Korean level of GDP x (with a positively signed coefficient) 
and on the level of Chinese level of GDP y (also with a positively signed coefficient) 
as per system (1). The coefficients of the Chinese GDP rate of growth differential 
equation are also positively signed. This has as a consequence a probable saddle 
equilibrium point in the long run with both GDPs reaching some high point in the 
distant future ceteris paribus. This can be more clearly seen with system (6), where 
the values of a and b can indicate that both GDPs of equilibrium S (see above) are 
such that the Korean GDP is no more than 5% of the sum of Chinese and Korean 
GDP (approximately the Korean population as a ratio to total Chinese and Korean 
population is about 4% now). In the very long run, economies will have the tendency 
to grow according to their population growth rates ceteris paribus (for example, if per 
capita income and technology are the same). This result together with our conclusion 
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regarding exports reconfirms our thesis about an inherent tendency for the fusion of 
Korean and Chinese economies (unless other events take place). 
 
The economic hub of the Shanghai greater region  
The East Asian region is much less homogeneous than the European region is, in 
terms of similarities in size, location and economic development of its constituent 
nations. China by its position and size seems to play a central role in this area (there is 
no “China” in Europe). In particular there is a sub-region in China, around Shanghai 
city that plays a very leading role. This region contains the following Chinese 
provinces (in whole or part): Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shandong (part). 
Together all these 4.25 provinces produce approximately 25% of the Chinese national 
income. A radius of about 2500 kms from Shanghai embraces most of China, Korea, 
Japan, and most of South East Asia; all this area is almost like Europe in terms of area 
but denser in population.    
 
We will support our contention about the central role of the Shanghai greater region 
as central to the development of the whole East Asia region with some more 
arguments. First we will conduct a cluster statistical analysis by examining the export 
patterns of all the major countries of the East Asia and Pacific Ocean greater region 
(data are extracted from ITC internet site). The dendogram of cluster analysis (Hair et 
al, 2006) in Figure 5 shows that some spontaneous groups have been formed already. 
The first is made of Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Japan (India as well) mainly because 
of their strong links with the USA (both Japan’s and Brazil’s exports to the USA 
constitute about 30% of their total exports). Korea, Taiwan, and Russia seem to group 
together thus giving some evidence that Korea does not seem to fit in the group with 
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Japan nor in the group with ASEAN. It is also important to note that Russia can 
eventually play a significant role in the East Asian region. 
 
Figure 5  Cluster analysis  
                          Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
    C A S E      0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label     Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  eCanada     3   òø 
  eMexico    10   òôòòòø 
  eBrazil     2   òú   ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø 
  eIndia     16   ò÷   ó                                   ó 
  eJapan      7   òòòòò÷                                   ó 
  eKorea      8   òûòòòòòø                                 ùòòòòòòòø 
  eTaiwan    13   ò÷     ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø           ó       ó 
  eRussia    17   òòòòòòò÷                     ó           ó       ó 
  eAustral    1   òòòûòòòòòòòòòòòø             ó           ó       ó 
  eIndones    6   òòò÷           ó             ùòòòòòòòòòòò÷       ó 
  ePhilipi   12   òûòø           ùòòòø         ó                   ó 
  eThailan   14   ò÷ ùòø         ó   ó         ó                   ó 
  eChina      5   òòòú ùòòòòòòòòò÷   ùòòòòòòòòò÷                   ó 
  eMalaysi    9   òòò÷ ó             ó                             ó 
  eChile      4   òòòòò÷             ó                             ó 
  eNewZeal   11   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                             ó 
  eUSA       15   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷ 
Note: Dendrogram using the Ward Method and z-scores 
 
Korea is very similar to Taiwan in terms of population, economic performance and so 
on, hence its tie with this country. If eventually Taiwan is absorbed by China, Korea 
will be left alone in the area. The ASEAN countries, plus Australia, plus China 
(Chile 6  as well) form another broad group (Indonesia seems to pair more with 
Australia). New Zealand (a very small country) and the USA seem to be rather 
independent from the other groups. This result is expected for the USA due to its 
particular characteristics (a leading world nation and rather independent 
economically).  
                                                 
6 Chile was included to test its relevance to its integration policies with Korea. 
 11
 
Second we will support our conclusions with a multidimensional scaling7 statistical 
analysis (Hair et al, 2006) using the same export data; this is shown in Figure 6. The 
results of the cluster analysis are confirmed here. The USA and New Zealand are 
away from the other groups. The group of Mexico, Canada, Brazil, Japan, and India is 
apparent; Korea and Taiwan are together (Russia is not far away from them) and close 
to the ASEAN group (plus Chile), although Australia and Indonesia seem once more 
to pair together.  
Figure 6  Scaling analysis: derived stimulus configuration 
3 210-1 
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Third we will refer to the so called Chinese Diaspora across several countries in the 
South East Asia region. Cheung (2004) has called this Chinese ethnic group a “virtual 
nation” holding a collective capital of about US$600 billion in 1996 and constituting a 
borderless empire. Its impact on national economies is considerable and adds more 
potential power to the Chinese economy and politics. Also its impact on regional 
integration is very important since it makes connections and relations in this region 
                                                 
7 Euclidean distances and z-scores were used (ALSCAL algorithm as per SPSS program). 
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easier through the networking facilities of its members. Consequently if a formal 
integration takes place between China and ASEAN then this integration will be 
further facilitated because of the role of the Chinese diaspora just described. 
   
Fourth, we should also ask the question whether or not China follows the East Asian 
development model, as initiated by other countries or regions such as Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. Baek (2005) concluded that the Chinese way of development 
shares many characteristics with the East Asian development, such as state control 
over finance, import substitution industrialization in heavy industry, a high rate of 
domestic savings, and so on. We support this conclusion and add that we can predict 
that the whole East Asian region is quite homogeneous from this point of view, hence 
making a formal integration easier to implement at least in the near future.  
 
The four points just briefly analysed all lead to the following overall conclusion: 
China and in particular the greater Shanghai region is becoming the moving force of 
economic development of East Asia. This is so, because China is already integrating 
with all other neighbours (this is confirmed by the cluster and scale statistical 
analysis); it has a penetrating human, financial, and social capital as represented by 
the Chinese diaspora; and it has similar development characteristics to those of many 
other East Asian countries.  
 
In view of all these points we can now answer a question that is more relevant to 
Korea, or any other “Korean” economy. Can this country become an economic hub in 
its region? Lee and Hobday (2003) identified a hub as being a central place for 
foreign direct investment, regional headquarters, financial institutions, commercial, 
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trading transhipment and logistics operations, high technology manufacturing, and 
technical support/R&D for foreign MNCs. These authors concluded that such a hub 
would be difficult to establish in Korea, as several interviews with senior executives 
indicated. As we have seen competition from the greater Shanghai region would make 
things much more difficult for Korea to play the same role as this Chinese area can 
play in the very long term (see Sanidas 2006 forthcoming). 
 
Policies of integration and long term future 
The foregoing analysis would suggest that each country, individually taken, will be 
fused with the potential huge market of China unless some other events occur. This 
fusion would be even more unavoidable if a formal integration arises. In this respect 
we can discern two contradictory forces. First all countries in the region would like to 
and as a matter of urgency must trade with China as much as possible. This situation 
can be compared with the prisoner’s dilemma situation. Each country individually 
taken will be better off by trading and integrating with China now given the potential 
market of the latter country although each one of them knows that in the very long 
term it will become a satellite of China both economically and politically. This 
situation is similar to the long term tendency for increasing environmental pollution 
although under a mutual enforced cooperation the best solution would be to reduce 
such pollution. 
 
Second all countries in the East Asia region would like to integrate amongst them 
selves in order to take advantage of the benefits of regional integration (such as 
increased trade flows, higher economic growth, and so on). But should this integration 
include China, or not? The group ASEAN was initially formed to enhance the South 
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East Asian countries development and cover itself from the increasing power of China 
in the region (both politically and economically). ASEAN has achieved a high 
integration and has increased its intra-regional trade significantly (see in this respect 
Jayanthakumaran and Sanidas, 2006). Korea has sought to integrate with South 
American countries such as Chile. Japan has been traditionally trading intensively 
with the USA. The dilemma remains: should these countries formally integrate with 
China as a group?  However, on an individual basis this dilemma ceases to exist as 
each one of them would like to enhance bilateral integration. Hence, as Park (1996, p. 
368) predicted, “East Asia will become increasingly dependent on China as its 
economic might grows…The countries on China’s periphery could very easily come 
to be known as the economic area of ‘greater China’…” 
 
Given the potential situation of eventual fusion of each individual small economy 
with China, a formal overall integration (which would include China) is not 
recommended at present. Instead the reinforcement of subgroups of regional 
integration is the best option in the medium term. Thus ASEAN8 should accelerate its 
integration and include Korea. On the other hand Korea, Japan, and Mongolia in the 
North should speed up their integration with more American countries such as Canada, 
Mexico, Brazil, and so on. Other options would be available under a more careful 
examination of the situation but this is outside the scope of this paper. For example 
Russia could potentially play a significant role in Asia (as well in Europe).    
 
                                                 
8 ASEAN seems to be the key to East Asian integration. All other countries in the greater region 
actively seek to form close ties with ASEAN, for example China, Japan, and India (see for instance He, 
2004, p. 106). The free trade area between ASEAN and China is the first one to emerge with certainty 
(Cai, 2003). 
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Furthermore, we should also mention the role of informal types of integration. We 
already mentioned the Chinese diaspora as one such type, but this also reinforces the 
Chinese potential for fusion with other countries. However there is also the so-called 
‘regional production network’ which is driven by Japanese foreign direct investment, 
mainly in the ASEAN group of nations (Peng, 2000). This network enhances the 
influence of Japan in the region but eventually it cannot be as strong as the potential 
size of the Chinese economy. Subregional economic zones are also another type of 
informal integration (Peng, 2002/2003). Although all these zones are important in 
East Asia, the Shanghai one will have the greatest impact on the region on account of 
what we proposed so far.  
 
At this point we must add a few thoughts on the relationship between economic and 
political integration. True economic integration cannot take place in the long run 
unless political integration follows as it is happening in Europe. However, “East 
Asian countries support regionalism for national interests and state power. Asian 
nationalism never significantly challenges a nation-state system” (He, 2004, p. 120). 
One of the aims of the present paper was to show that this nation-state system is very 
asymmetric in East Asia. The Central Country (China) is much larger than any other 
one in the area and this asymmetry can lead to many problems. One of them is the 
fusion of smaller economies with China as was extensively analysed above. 
 
This asymmetry can be further observed with the following behaviour as He (2004, p. 
116) argues: “Unlike the middle powers of Malaysia or Korea, China’s status as a big 
country and big power in Asia reduces its incentive to establish regionalism for its 
survival and influence”. Consequently, unless politically all East Asian countries feel 
 16
the need to become one nation under the Chinese umbrella, an economic fusion in the 
long run between China and each one of its “neighbours” will be a de facto political 
fusion as well. We can imagine that at least Japan and Indonesia would strongly resist 
such a fusion; and perhaps a united Korea would as well. The 21st century will tell us 
to which extent this fusion will take place.  
 
    
Acknowledgment: The author thanks the organizers of the Seoul conference in Korea for their 
financing of this paper’s presentation.  
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